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The Honorable Nancy Gertner*
The case was a classic one: The defendant, a woman named Amhru Dyce,
pled guilty to being a drug courier, commonly known as a "mule." She had no
criminal record. She was the principal caretaker of two young children and a
three-month-old infant whom she was still nursing. The district court judge
labored over her case. He held hearings over four days in which he explored
the question of who would care for the children, and in particular, how the
infant would be nourished. He worried aloud that, in time, all three children
would receive inadequate attention, and perhaps even be sent to foster care.
Finally, he decided to grant a downward departure from the sentencing
range required by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter "Guidelines")
on a number of grounds, one of which involved her care of her children. While
the Guidelines suggest that family circumstances are not "ordinarily relevant"
to the sentencing decision, § 5H1.6 permits departures for what has come to be
known as "extraordinary family circumstances."' Instead of sentencing Ms.
Dyce to five years imprisonment, as prescribed by the Guidelines, the court
sentenced her to five years of probation, two of which were to be served in a
residential treatment program, followed by one year in a community
correctional facility or halfway house.
2
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding
"nothing to suggest that Dyce's family circumstances were in any degree
'extraordinary,"' 3 and then refused rehearing en banc.4  The trial judge's
concern for the welfare of Amhru Dyce's three children was, in the panel's
words, "ill-founded.",5 The court concluded that "[t]he unfortunate fact is that
some mothers are criminals; and, like it or not, incarceration is our criminal
Judge, United States District Court, District of Massachusetts.
1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5hl.6(2001)("Family ties and responsibilities., are
not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline
range")[hereinafter GUIDELINES].
2. United States v. Dyce, 874 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1994) [hereinafter Dyce 1], rev d, 78 F. 3d 610
(D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Dyce II].
3. Dyce 11, 78 F.3d at 255.
4. United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Dyce III].
5. Dycell, 78 F. 3dat616.
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justice system's principal method of punishment. ... So, Ms. Dyce went to
jail. We don't know what happened to her children.
The issue is not just that "some mothers" are criminals. It is that the
overwhelming majority of women accused of crime are mothers, and many are
single parents. The decisions of the drafters of the Sentencing Reform Act
("SRA") 7 and the Sentencing Guidelines to discourage consideration of family
circumstances has a disproportionate impact on women offenders, and their
dependents, wholly without penal justification.8 Moreover, whatever the
Commission and Congress did to the consideration of family obligations, the
various courts of appeals have done worse. The Guideline's language in §
5H1.6 has been narrowed in some cases virtually to extinction without basis in
law, fact, or policy. Judge Wald, in her oft-cited dissent in Dyce, was poignant
and pointed. While she noted that the Court "misread the record" about the
adequacy of care for Dyce's children, 9 her concerns were more profound:
Talmudic distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary suffering
aside, this is a strange kind of jurisprudence for a family-oriented
society. The panel's conclusion, even if factually correct, is based
entirely on a notion that so long as the extended family can provide
economic care and physical custody, no further inquiry is necessary as
to the import of separating the siblings from each other, as well as
from their mother, without realistic possibility of even visitation. Even
the constraining effect of the Guidelines does not prohibit
consideration of these factors-all of which are central, I think, to a
nuanced determination of whether family circumstances qualify as
'extraordinary' or not.'°
The Guidelines' treatment of family circumstances is emblematic of the
Guidelines' treatment of women offenders. I say this even while
acknowledging that both before and after the enactment of the Guidelines,
women offenders have been treated more leniently than male offenders."
6. Id. at 617.
7. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 96-473, 96 Stat.1967 (codified in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
8. This is not to deny that large numbers of male offenders are fathers, whose incarceration has a
significant impact on the lives of their children. Rather, it is to recognize the reality of child rearing
patterns in our society in general; responsibility for raising children falls disproportionately on women.
Myrna Raeder's work is particularly instructive. She paints a dramatic portrait of the "lopsided effect"
that imprisoning women has on their children, because of the documented asymmetry in child rearing
responsibilities in the society in general, and in the offender population in particular. Myma S. Raeder,
Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-
Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 905, 950 (1993).
9. Dycell, 91 F.3dat 1475.
10. Id.
11. For a discussion of the lenient sentencing of women offenders in the pre-Guidelines era, see
Raeder, supra note 8, at 916. For one example of continuing leniency after the Guidelines, see Ilene H.
Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal Treatment
Policy Choices and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
85 J. CRAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 216 (1994) (finding that women disproportionately benefit from
downward departure from the sentencing range for substantial assistance to the authorities, downward
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Nevertheless, it is also true that many more women, who would have received
no jail time pre-Guidelines, are now imprisoned, for longer and longer
periods. 12
It is not unreasonable to ask why. Why have incarceration rates for women
increased so dramatically? Is this increase justified by the statutory purposes of
sentencing, 3 or any criminal justice policy at all? Are the sources of women's
crime different? Do different factors trigger their rehabilitation than with male
offenders? What is it about just deserts, or deterrence, or incapacitation that
undergirds this policy?
The short answer is that women's crime is different from men's crime.
Women commit different crimes than men, generally non-violent crimes. Their
life circumstances are different from the life circumstances of men as are the
factors that motivate them to break the law. Family ties play a more significant
role in women's offenses, in the likelihood that they will recidivate, and in their
chances of rehabilitation. Because family obligations fall disproportionately on
women in this society their imprisonment has a disproportionate impact on the
children in their care.
Women's relationships with their male codefendants may also be different.
It is not unusual to see women defendants who have been subject to coercion,
abuse, and even battering. When they commit crimes, women are less likely to
be in leadership roles, more likely the girlfriends or wives of the leaders.
A sentencing system that does not take these differences into account is
hardly just, and surely not neutral.
I. FROM BEING "NEUTRAL" TO BEING "IRRELEVANT"
The Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines were enacted because of
general concerns about "unwarranted disparity" in sentencing,14 particularly
with respect to race and national origin.15 While the drafters were aware of the
disparity between the treatment of men and women offenders pre-Guidelines, it
departure for atypical facts and circumstances, and selection of sentence in the low-end of the sentencing
range).
12. Raeder, supra note 8, at 926-27.
13. The SRA directs that the court shall consider the following in imposing a sentence: "(A) to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide for just punishment
for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner." 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2).
14. The SRA authorized the United States Sentencing Commission to create sentencing guidelines
that "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, [thus] avoiding unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
15. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1,4-5 (1988).
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was hardly of paramount importance.' 6  In any case, where women are
concerned the "cure" for disparity may well be worse than the disease. The
Guidelines' gender equality is illusory.
The SRA directed the Commission to develop guidelines and policy
statements that are "entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed,
and socio-economic status of offenders.' 17 The Commission, however, took
that directive and promulgated § 5H1.10. Section 5H1.10 notes that these
factors, including sex, are "not relevant in the determination of the sentence."
' 8
But being "neutral" as to gender and characterizing gender as "not relevant" are
not necessarily the same thing.
Employment discrimination law under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,' 9 for example, recognized two theories of discrimination-"disparate
treatment" and "disparate impact." In disparate treatment analysis, the focus
was on the individual wrongdoer who inappropriately used gender in making
decisions. In disparate impact analysis, the focus was on rules which were
neutral on their face, but had a discriminatory impact on women. Beginning
with Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,20 and to varying degrees over the past decades,
courts have recognized that the formal neutrality of the rule, while important,
was not the end of the analysis. Some "neutral rules" were in fact a pretext for
continuing discrimination, like the poll taxes imposed by state governments in
the South following the Civil War. Some neutral rules had a differential impact
on women because of past discrimination; one example was rules requiring past
experience in the job, when the employer had formerly refused to hire women.
Other neutral rules had a differential impact derived from societal
discrimination, or physiological differences between men and women, such as
rules prohibiting workers with school-age children in certain jobs, or some
height and weight requirements.21
Plainly, the word "neutrality" in the SRA refers to the "disparate
treatment" model. The legislative history suggests that Congress was
concerned about the judge who explicitly took race or gender into account.22
The goal of reform was to guard against the use of these factors in upward
16. KATHLEEN DALY, GENDER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1994) (arguing that it was the
"compelling stories of racial disparity that spawned the sentencing reform movement ... .").
17. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (d) (1994). Section 5HI.10 is a policy statement. In addition to the Guidelines
themselves, the Supreme Court has held even policy statements are binding on the courts, so long as
they do not violate the Constitution or are inconsistent with the statutory directives. Stinson v. United
States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
18. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at § 5HI.10.
19. 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) et seq.
20. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
21. Nancy Gertner, Bakke on Affirmative Action For Women: Pedestal or Cage? 14 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 173, 189-91 (1979) (typology of neutral rules).
22. Symposium, Equality Versus Discretion in Sentencing, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1813, 1815-16
(1989) (statement of Commissioner Ilene Nagel).
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departures for poor, disadvantaged and minority defendants. 23 Nothing in the
SRA or its history suggests that the Commission in drafting the Guidelines, or
courts in interpreting them, were supposed to turn a blind eye to the
disproportionate impact of neutral rules on offenders in these categories,
especially women offenders. The language of the Senate Report suggests
otherwise. "The requirement of [sentencing] neutrality with regard to such
factors [race, sex, national origin, creed, and socio-economic status] is not a
requirement of blindness.
" 24
Consider the following: If a company prohibited annual leave based on
family obligations for all employees, while it allowed leave for other reasons,
we would be concerned about the disproportionate impact such a policy would
have on women workers who more often had principal responsibility for
children. If the qualifications for jury service encouraged the exclusion of
citizens on account of family obligations, we would be concerned that the net
effect of such a policy would be to exclude women from an important
obligation of public life. Likewise, a host of decisions made by the Guidelines'
drafters, though neutral on their face, have redounded to the detriment of
women offenders. To address the problem of unwarranted disparity, the
Guidelines tried to enact a formal equality, to treat similarly situated defendants
similarly. But the reference point was skewed. As I describe below, the
drafters sought to compare offenders for the most part with reference to so-
called objective factors, like offense conduct and criminal history, but not so-
called subjective factors, like family circumstances or mens rea. While offense
conduct and criminal history might be adequate to define the sentence of most
offenders-although even that point is debatable-these factors do not
remotely address the problems of women offenders. The result of discouraging
departures for family responsibilities of both men and women, for example, is
like the famous critique of legal equality-rich and poor can both sleep under
25the bridge. It is an empty equality.
I use a number of sources for my presentation. First, my own docket, the
cases that I have seen and decided. Second, my knowledge of the cases before
other judges in my court which I examined as part of my role as liaison judge to
the Probation Department, and as part of my sentencing methodology. 26 Third,
23. The legislative history of the provision suggests that the Congress discouraged courts from
considering family ties and responsibilities, education and vocational skills, merely to "guard against the
inappropriate use of incarceration for those defendants who lack education, employment and stabilizing
ties." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3221-23 at 3358.
24. S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3354 n. 409.
25. Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 586 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LyS
ROUGE ch. VII (1894)) ("The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep
under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.").
26. For example, see United States v. Thompson, 190 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. Mass. 2002) (hereinafter
Thompson III). This case involved the re-sentencing of the defendant, John Thompson, in light of the
First Circuit's decision in United States v. Thompson, 234 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2000) (hereinafter
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the work of a number of authors who have studied women offenders, and in
particular, the work of Cassidy Kesler, a Yale Law student, who has compiled a
substantial amount of previously unpublished information regarding women
offenders sentenced under the Guidelines in her insightful paper, Where
Women Fit: Gender and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.27
In particular, Kesler describes the difference between "gender-related"
disparity between offenders and "gender-based" disparity:
[Gender-based] disparity describes a situation where a judge makes a
more or less harsh sentencing determination because of an offender's
gender. In contrast, gender-related sentencing disparity describes a
situation where a judge makes a more or less harsh sentencing
determination because of other factors that happen to correlate with
gender. While gender-based sentencing disparity is a highly charged
issue that relates to conceptions and expectations of equality, gender-
related sentencing disparity can be explained and even justified in
gender-neutral terms.
She concludes: "Although the Guidelines are facially neutral with respect
to gender, underlying sentencing factors are not distributed evenly across
gender, and thus the weight or lack thereof given by the Guidelines to various
gender-related factors has a disproportionate effect.",
29
My goals in this very short presentation are to evaluate how the Guidelines
treat each of the gender-related attributes that Kesler and others have identified.
In addition, I have tried to flesh out the Guidelines' treatment of additional
sentencing factors which I hypothesize are likely to have a gendered impact.
Finally, in a very preliminary way, I hope to point the way to legislative and
guideline changes, and even suggest changes in judicial interpretation of the
existing framework.
II. GENDER-BASED DISPARITY/ DISPARATE TREATMENT
Obviously, disparity in sentencing based on gender is troubling and should
be eliminated. One might expect to find such disparity in the decisions of
judges concerning where, within the Guidelines range, to sentence offenders.
One might also expect to find such disparity in judicial departure decisions,
Thompson 11). The original district court decision is found at 74 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass. 1999)
(hereinafter Thompson 1).
27. Cassidy Kesler, Where Women Fit: Gender and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Nov. 8,
2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal of Law and Feminism). A summary of her
paper, as well as a presentation she made of her findings at the Symposium on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines held at Yale Law School on November 8, 2002, will be published in the Federal Sentencing
Reporter in 2003.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. at 8.
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when the court concludes that the Guidelines range is not appropriate to the
case at bar.
30
In fact, as Kesler reports, most offenders-but women even more so than
3!men-are sentenced at the low end of the Guidelines range. In addition, men
are more likely than women to be sentenced to the range maximum. 32 At the
same time, while earlier commentators concluded that judges were granting
downward departures from the Guidelines range disproportionately more for
women than for men,33 Kesler looked at more recent data and suggests
otherwise. Kesler found that overall downward departure rates for men and
women were nearly identical: women receiving substantial assistance
departures at a slightly higher rate, and men receiving other downward
departures at a slightly higher rate.34
Without further research, there is no way of knowing whether judges are
sentencing women at the low end of the range because of inappropriate
generalizations about women-the classic, gender-based factors--or because of
a desire to compensate for the Guidelines' failure to account for specific
gender-related factors.
III. GENDER RELATED DISPARITY/ DISPARATE IMPACT
A. Women Offenders Have More Responsibility for Children than Male
Offenders
Perhaps the most significant gender-related problems are those involving
women with children, like Amhru Dyce. In my personal experience, and as
reported by various scholars,35 women offenders are more likely than men to be
single parents. Kesler, again using recent data, reports that women offenders
are more likely to be divorced, widowed and separated than men offenders.
36
In addition, she found that married women offenders are more likely to report
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) instructs a court that, in determining whether there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind or to a degree not adequately considered by the Commission. In doing
so, the court is obliged to consider "only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Sentencing Commission." See also GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5A2.0.
31. Kesler, supra note 27, at 18, 45-47.
32. Id.
33. See generally Nagel & Johnson, supra note 11.
34. Kesler, supra note 27, at 17-18, 45-47. To be sure, in a recent conversation, Kesler noted that it
is important to conduct further research on downward departures with regard specifically to border
districts and the way in which "fast-track strategies" in such districts may skew national departure rates
since most of the defendants in such districts are male. Interview with Cassidy Kesler, Yale Law School
student (Nov. 15, 2002).
35. Raeder, supra note 8, at 913.
36. Kesler, supra note 27, at 11-12, 33-35.
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having at least one dependent than men offenders.37 Although the Sentencing
Commission's data is ambiguous on the question of who is a dependent, Kesler
notes it is possible that men are more likely than women to count spouses as
dependents. 38 Even with the imperfections of the data, Kesler's work suggests
that women offenders are more likely to be single parents or have primary
caretaking responsibilities for their children than men offenders. While that
conclusion entirely matches my experience, further study is obviously
necessary.
Despite this reality, the approach of the panel majority in Dyce has been
the paradigmatic approach of the courts of appeals-disallowing the departure
with, as Judge Wald described, little or no nuanced analysis. 39 Few courts have
asked, for example: "What is the purpose of this departure? ' 40 The consensus
seems to be that the purpose of the departure is to minimize the harsh
consequences of an offender's imprisonment on innocent third parties, like
children and spouses, but beyond that there is little clarity. 41 The Guidelines
include little or no explanation of what the Commissioners intended, no
legislative history, no committee reports, no data on which the Guideline was
based. And on this tabula rasa, appellate courts have simply announced that the
Guidelines' statement that family circumstances are "not ordinarily relevant" to
sentencing, means that only an "atypical" impact on family members can be the
basis for a departure. What, after all, does "typical" mean? As compared to
whom? 42 Is the enterprise empirical-just counting up the number of offenders
37. Id.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Dycel1l, 91 F.3d at 1475.
40. The Commission has given little guidance, as I noted in United States v. LaCarubba, 184 F.
Supp. 2d 89, 92 (D. Mass. 2002):
While other guidelines-what the base offense level is for a given quantity of drugs, for
example-are precise, this guideline [§5H.16] is vague. While other guidelines provide an
elaborate rationale or even specific examples, this guideline does not. Nor did the
Commission publish evidence to support its conclusions that "offender characteristics are not
ordinarily relevant," even though Congress encouraged it to "subject those factors to
intelligent and dispassionate professional analysis" . . . It never made available to courts and
advocates the data supporting the "typical case," from which to judge the atypical. There is
no legislative history ... no committee reports, no public hearings [transcripts]..
(footnotes omitted).
41. The question is whether the family circumstances departure is defendant-focused, namely to
reward a defendant's extraordinary good works, or to take account of an extraordinary burden on the
defendant, such as losing custody of a child, to address the impact of incarceration on innocent family
members? The consensus is the latter. Id. at 92.
42. In Thompson I, I asked:
... What is the standard by which to judge "extraordinary" family obligations or an
"extraordinary" work history? What class of defendants define "ordinary"? While the
Sentencing Commission and the case law offer little guidance on the subject, one thing is
clear: The baseline is not, nor should it be, 'Ozzie and Harriet,' the fictional two parent, two
child, suburban home.
Thompson 1, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 70. See also Karen R. Smith, United States v. Johnson: The Second
Circuit Overcomes the Sentencing Guidelines' Myopic View of "Not Ordinarily Relevant" Family
Responsibilities of the Criminal Offender, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 573, 607 (1993) ( "That the Commission
at least considered family circumstances is clear, but what it believed to be 'ordinary' family
[Vol. 14: 291
Women Offenders and the Sentencing Guidelines
that qualify? If it is not, if the courts are really making judgments concerning
how typical an offender's circumstances have to be-one in one-hundred, one
in four-aren't they making normative, even policy judgments? 43  What are
those normative judgments based on? What sentencing purposes are being
advanced?
The resulting decisional law is not only chaotic, but unfair. The same data
that shows that the disproportionate impact on women of discouraging
consideration of family obligations has somehow been transformed by the
courts into a justification for continuing it. Single parenting is indeed "typical"
for women offenders and tragically so. Because it is so typical, because
women invariably wind up with a disproportionate share of caretaking
responsibilities, courts have suggested that such responsibilities should not be
44considered in sentencing any offenders. Moreover, since statistics suggest
that single parent status is more typical of Black women than White women,
the standard especially disadvantages them.45 Finally, since the basis for the
family departure is entirely unexamined, it opens the door to other biases,
46notably economic and class biases. Some courts understand the impact of an
circumstances and the ordinary and tolerable consequences of incarceration upon a family is somewhat
shrouded in mystery and subject to intense speculation.").
43. See LaCarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 93:
How does this human being compare to others the trial court has seen? But it necessarily
involves more than simply counting noses. How atypical does he or she have to be - one in
a million, five in a million, five percent of all defendants, etc.? This kind of line-drawing
involves the exercise of normative judgments: What kind of punishment do human beings
facing these situations deserve given the purposes of the [SRA}? Where ought the line
between typical and atypical be? No bright line rule was announced by the Commission;
none can be announced by a court.
44. The First Circuit has gone even further. For example, in United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 81
(2001), it suggested that the defendant must show that the care he or she rendered was "irreplaceable" to
qualify for a departure. The court subsequently amended the "irreplaceable" standard in an errata form.
Ironically, the "irreplaceable" standard may be more helpful to women than the "typicality" standard. It
looks more to impact and less to statistics.
45. Raeder, supra note 8, at 950-51:
While currently almost two-thirds of single parents are White, single parenting is much more
prevalent among Blacks than Whites. In fact, almost sixty-three percent of Black family
groups with children are single-parent, as compared with twenty- three percent of White
family groups. Single parenting among Hispanics has also increased, now comprising about
one-third of Hispanic family groups with children. Presently, 92.6 percent of Black single
parents are female, compared to 86.7 percent who are Hispanic and 83.7 percent who are
White. It is almost a certainty that a majority of female federal prisoners are minority
women. This is consistent with Sentencing Commission data which shows that minority
women are now the majority of sentenced female offenders. Moreover, Black females
consistently have comprised a higher percentage of the federal female inmate population than
the comparable percentage of Black males. Therefore, Black and Hispanic female offenders
are more likely to be disadvantaged by the inability to obtain departures based on their status
as single mothers than are White women. (footnotes omitted)
46. The legislative history of the provision authorizing the "family circumstances" guideline
suggests that Congress's goal was to discourage courts from considering family ties in order to keep
them from departing upward in the case of disadvantaged defendants. Congress warned the
Commission to "guard against the inappropriate use of incarceration for those defendants who lack
education, employment and stabilizing ties." S. REP. No. 98-225 at 175, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3358. See also Susan E. Ellingstad, The Sentencing Guidelines: Downward Departures
Based on a Defendant's Extraordinary Family Ties and Responsibilities, 76 MINN. L.REV. 957, 973
(1992). As I noted in Thompson 11:
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imprisoned family member on the families of white collar defendants more
readily than the impact of imprisonment on other families.
47
The issue-the impact on families of the imprisonment of the defendant-
needs to be carefully reexamined by all the participants in the federal
sentencing system. I am not suggesting a departure for women only. For the
purpose of this presentation, my approach is more limited: I am suggesting a
more nuanced reexamination of the issue for all offenders, recognizing the
importance of the issue and the disproportionate impact of its exclusion on
women. Nothing about the existing guidelines or the existing decisional law
should prevent this examination. The courts, after all, have chosen to interpret
guidelines on family circumstances that are in fact ambiguous in the crabbed
way suggested by Dyce. There were other options more respectful of the real
circumstances of offenders and their families, and of the purposes of
sentencing.
48
Yet, it appears from my review of the records, that the situation Congress was concerned
about has, to a degree, continued. Of the 48 cases in which downward departures were
given, just over 60% were in white collar cases, largely involving defendants with
advantaged backgrounds. By contrast, over the last five years, only 27% of the sentencings
in this District were for white collar offenses.
190 F. Supp. 2d at 145. Specifically, I indicated:
Data provided by the Probation Department tracking sentencings in this District demonstrates
this point. White collar offenses- including tax offenses, obstruction of justice, perjury,
money laundering, gambling, fraud, forgery, counterfeiting, and embezzlement-constituted
25.5% of 546 sentencings in calendar year 2001,24.9% of 576 sentencings in 2000, 28.2% of
517 sentencings in 1999, 26.5% of 522 sentencings in 1998, and 31.3% of 454 sentencings in
1997. While this data does not extend all the way back to 1992, the beginning of my review
of defendants who received family circumstances departures, there is no reason to believe
that the percentage of defendants convicted of white collar offenses between 1992 and 1996
would be remarkably different from the percentage between 1997 and 2001.
Id. at 145, n.14.
47. 1 have observed analogous problems in pre-sentence reports prepared by probation officers.
One report will say - if the defendant goes to prison, his family will be obliged to get government
assistance, Aid for Families with Dependent Children - and implies that that would be a devastating
blow. Another report would describe the very same impact - children on AFDC - and suggest that
the impact is less than substantial. In the case I observed, the former was the report of a white
defendant, the latter the report of a black defendant. No discrimination was intended; the pre-sentence
report writers were different. It may well be a question of perspective - whose situation inspires
empathy in the probation officer. Some may say that the best way to address this potential bias,
however inadvertent, is by eliminating all instances in which discretion may be exercised. That
approach was consistent with the approach of initial Guideline drafters - to minimize subjective
decisionmaking. See generally Breyer, supra note 15. I do not agree. Eliminating the exercise of
judgment about the lives of human beings creates a mindless uniformity, heedless of real differences
between offenders.
48. Indeed, it may well be that because the drafters of the Guidelines considered the impact on
women offenders so little, departures should be considered on the general grounds under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b), a mitigating circumstance not adequately considered by the Commission. As Raeder indicates:
Unquestionably, pregnant women and single mothers should be eligible for downward
departures in the current Guidelines regime. Such departures are warranted because neither
single mothers nor mothers-to-be are ordinary when viewed in the framework of the total
sentenced population. Alternatively, such departures are authorized because the Guidelines
did not contemplate the effect of incarceration on the children of single mothers. Even
though the Guidelines are written in gender-neutral language, some of the policy,
commentary, and application notes were drafted using solely male pronouns...
Raeder, supra note 8, at 949. See also supra note 30. For different points of view see Jennifer Segal,
Family Ties and Federal Sentencing: A Critique of the Literature, 13 Fed. Sent. Rep. 258 (March/April
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B. Women Offenders Commit Less Serious Crimes
Women are sentenced to shorter sentences, as a general matter, because the
crimes they commit are less serious than the crimes that men commit. The
crimes of women offenders cluster around drugs, embezzlement and fraud.49
Lower offense levels are likely to mean more sentencing options, including
probation, home confinement, and community confinement.50
But although there are real differences between the kinds of crimes men
and women commit those differences are minimized by the structure of the
Guidelines. Offenders who plead guilty and accept responsibility for their
offenses are given a downward adjustment of two points. Those whose offense
level is at least sixteen, however, receive a full three-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. 51 Paradoxically, since women are less likely to
commit crimes at a higher offense level, they receive less credit for their
assistance to the administration of justice, pleading guilty and accepting
responsibility for their actions.
IV. WOMEN ARE MORE LIKELY THAN MEN TO BE FIRST TIME OFFENDERS
Kesler's data concerning the criminal history of men and women offenders
is especially striking. She reports that women are twice as likely as men to
52have no prior record. In addition, women are more likely to be in the lowest
criminal history category (I).5
3
These statistics mask a serious difference between men and women
offenders. The first-offender criminal history category under the Guidelines,
Category I, includes all in a single category individuals who have never had
any encounters with the criminal justice system at all, those who have not even
been arrested, as well as individuals who have been arrested and convicted but
received relatively short sentences.54 Women are disproportionately clustered
in the no arrest/first-offender category, a difference that the Guidelines do not
adequately take into account.
For all other criminal history categories, the Guidelines permit a judge to
evaluate whether or not the category overstates or understates the likelihood of
2001); Amy Farrell, Distinguishing Among the "'Unhappys": The Influence of Cultural Gender Norms
on Judicial Decisions, 13 Fed. Sent. Rep. 268 (March/April 2001).
49. Kesler, supra note 27, at 9-10, 24-25; Phyllis J. Newton, et. al., Gender, Individuality and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 8 Fed. Sent. Rep. 148, 150 (1995).
50. GUIDELINES, supra note I, § 5A. See also Kesler supra note 27, at 13-14, 37-38 (finding
women offenders more likely to receive sentencing options and more likely to be a lower sentence zone
than men offenders).
51. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 3El.l(b). This may explain why women are less likely to get the
full three point reduction. Kesler, supra note 27, at 14; Newton et al., supra note 49, at 150.
52. Kesler, supra note 27, at 15, 40.
53. Id.
54. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 4A. See also Kesler, supra note 27, at 15.
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recidivism or the offender's culpability and depart accordingly.55 In the case of
Criminal History Category I, however, the judge can go no lower. 56
Again, it may be that judges account for these limitations in the
Guidelines' treatment of first offenders by sentencing women to the rock
bottom of the Guidelines' range. The question is whether even that correction
is enough to account for meaningful differences between offenders in Criminal
History Category I, especially women offenders.
V. WOMEN OFFENDERS AND ADJUSTMENTS FOR THEIR ROLE IN OFFENSES AND
MENS REA
The SRA explicitly directed the Commission to consider whether and to
what extent sentences should reflect a defendant's "role in the offense" and his
or her "mental and emotional conditions.,58 Plainly, such factors had been an
important part of sentencing pre-Guidelines, central to the goal of setting
punishments that were proportional to the crime and the defendant's
culpability. The Commission's response, however, has been widely
criticized.59 To a considerable extent, the Guidelines denigrated such factors in
determining punishment. And that approach, like the others described above,
has had a substantial impact on the sentencing of women offenders.
A. Role in the Offense
Sentences can be increased or decreased depending on whether the
offender was an organizer, leader or supervisor of a group who engaged in
criminal activity, or was only a minor or minimal participant.60 However, the
sentencing adjustment for role in the offense is minor relative to other
55. See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 4A1.3. See also, e.g., United States v. Lacy, 99 F. Supp. 2d
108, 120 (D. Mass. 2000); United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d. 23, 33 (D. Mass. 1998).
56. For a time, courts fashioned what was in effect a super first-offender category, one for whom
the offense was characterized as "single acts of aberrant conduct." The Commission noted in its initial
guidelines that it had "not dealt with ... single acts of aberrant behavior that still may justify probation
at higher offense levels through departures." GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § IA, cmt. 4(d). In any event,
the circuits split on the application of this concept - more rigidly in some and more leniently in others.
Compare United States v. Grandmaison, 72 F.3d 555 (1st Cir. 1996), and United States v. Glick, 946
F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991). The Commission "resolved" the differences by effectively splitting the
difference: making the test stricter, but not as strict as the most rigid courts. GUIDELINES, supra note I,
§ 5K2.20.
57. "That the percentage of first-time women offenders is twice that of men could both explain and
justify certain aggregate gender differentials in sentencing, such as the higher percentage of women
offenders who receive sentencing options in addition to or instead of prison only." Kesler, supra note
27, at 15.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(4).
59. See Jack B. Weinstein & Fred A. Bernstein, The Denigration ofMens Rea in Drug Sentencing,
7 Fed. Sent. Rep. 121 (1994).
60. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 3B1.1, cmts.
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Guideline factors.6 1 Factors which can be objectively measured, like drug
weights or the amount of money involved, can increase a sentence from offense
level six to forty-three, with a corresponding imprisonment range extending
from probation to life imprisonment. "Role in the offense" adjustments,
however, rarely affect the base offense level more than two or four levels. The
result is that all offenders may find themselves held responsible at sentencing
for criminal behavior of a scope and severity about which they may not have
been fully aware. And for women, the problem is exacerbated. If criminal
enterprises mirror "legitimate" enterprises, then one would expect to find
women clustered at the bottom, more minor players than major ones, more
couriers and mules than distributors and dealers. Indeed, the data concerning
adjustments for role in the offense bear this out.
While Kesler found that male offenders are more likely to receive upward
adjustments for an aggravating role and female offenders are more likely to
receive downward adjustments for a mitigating role, most offenders receive
63no adjustment at all. The adjustments women offenders do receive, however,
may be less than the adjustments they should receive. And even when they
receive a downward adjustment on this basis, the change in their sentence is
relatively minor.
B. Mens Rea/Coercion
The Commission promulgated § 5H1.3, indicating that "mental and
emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
sentence should be outside the guideline range." 64 It was a major step. Mens
rea had been a significant part of sentencing for over a hundred years. But
while it was clear that the Commission wanted to discourage the application of
these factors in the sentencing calculus, how that applied in a concrete case was
less than clear. As was the case with family circumstances departures, nowhere
in the Guidelines themselves, or the interpretive material, is there any definition
of when mental and emotional conditions are relevant-i.e., what is ordinary
and what is extraordinary.
Notwithstanding § 5H.1.3, certain mental condition departures are
encouraged under the Guidelines. Section 5K2.13 allows the court to depart
from the Guidelines for defendants who qualify as suffering from "diminished
capacity." But there are limits: Only offenders who have committed
nonviolent offenses may qualify, and their "significantly reduced mental
61. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1938 (1988).
62. Kesler, supra note 27, at 16-17, 43-44.
63. Id.
64. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5H 1.3.
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capacity" 65 cannot have resulted from the "voluntary use of drugs or other
intoxicants. ' 66 Finally, the departure does not apply to those defendants whose
criminal history indicates "a need for incarceration to protect the public. 67
In addition, § 5K2.12 68 provides that coercion or duress, though not
amounting to a complete defense, may also justify the court's granting a
downward departure. But this departure ground is also limited: "ordinarily"
coercion is sufficiently serious to warrant departure only when it involves a
threat of physical injury.69 Battered women's syndrome, for example, may be
considered in connection with a departure for diminished capacity. The
underlying issue concerns mental capacity, not gender, even though the
syndrome is one that correlates with gender.
70
From the literature, it seems clear that more women then men do take
advantage of these provisions. 71 But what we do not know is the numbers of
women offenders who should have done so. We have no statistics regarding
the number of women offenders who might have qualified for coercion or
duress defenses, or for battered women syndrome. This information would
have to be gleaned from pre-sentence reports, which may or may not reflect the
real complexity of the situation.
Apart from the limitations built into these provisions, their use is limited by
the fact that they are framed as Guideline "departures" rather than ordinary
adjustments to the Guideline sentence. In order to make a case for such a
departure, counsel has to be proactive-preserve the issue (in the event of a
plea), make the record, present the information in a coherent form, provide
supporting data. In order to justify such a departure, the court has to agree with
counsel, and has to make express findings on the record.
In my experience, few lawyers even bother to examine the relationship




68. GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 5K2.12.
69. Id.
70. United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 898-904 (9th Cir. 1992) (permitting battered women
syndrome to be considered as under § 5K2.10, which provides that if the victim's wrongful conduct
contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, the court may reduce the sentence); United
States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1992). Moreover, there are issues short of duress or coercion,
which the Guidelines do not address. As Raeder noted:
While it may be stereotypical to assume that men lead women astray, and therefore women
are not fully responsible for their criminal offenses, one federal prison warden has observed,
"Females who make their way to prison have been socialized more toward dependent
relationships, as opposed to life activities that promote independence." Thus, a number of
women offenders whose circumstances do not fit the classic definition of physical coercion
appear to be dominated by a male with whom they have a relationship. In one case the judge
described a woman as being under the "Svengali" spell of her boyfriend. ...
Raeder, supra note 8, at 972-73.
71. Raeder notes that "In practice, departures for coercion are more significant for females than for
males, and are used more frequently by White women than minority women." Raeder, supra note 8, at
969-70.
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In one case before me, for example, a woman pled guilty with a plea agreement
permitting neither side to move for a departure. The pre-sentence report,
however, suggested that the woman may have been battered by the drug dealer
for whom she worked. I called for further psychiatric evaluation to explore the
woman's mental state and, in particular, to determine if the defendant suffered
from battered women stress disorder. The report concluded that she did, and I
departed downward.
It is difficult to know how many other such offenders should have been
treated in the same way but were not because of the failure of advocacy, or the
reticence of the court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout the 70s and 80s, feminist litigators recognized the limitations
of formal equality. Rules in employment or school settings that were equal on
paper were nevertheless seen as unfair if they had a disproportionate impact on
women for a host of social and cultural reasons. Equally unfair is a sentencing
regime that fails to take into account the real differences between male
offenders and female offenders, differences that may well correlate with the
sources of women's crime, and, perhaps, with the seeds of their rehabilitation.
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